The Presidential Circular on the 2027 Budget Is Out of Line with the Country’s Economic Realities

The SND30 Has Never Been Properly Budgeted! Paragraph 3 of this circular reiterates that the 2027 budget is part of the continued implementation of the National Development Strategy 2020–2030 (SND30). This is nothing more than a ritualistic formula. Yet a strategy can only be translated into a budget when its targets become identifiable budget allocations, disbursement schedules, and clearly designated officials responsible for delivery. Nothing of the sort appears in the circular. The circular requires a budgetary program to “derive from Strategic Performance Frameworks aligned with the SND30” (point 60). The fact that the document still has to demand that budgets be aligned with the strategy, when only three years remain before its end, is an admission of failure: the SND30 remains a reference document that people cite, not a framework that actually constrains budgetary decisions. Textbook Bureaucratic Double-Speak The document methodically ticks every rhetorical box of bureaucratic double-standards, starting with the use of empty concepts. We are told to “strengthen,” “continue,” “accelerate,” “ensure,” “consolidate,” “intensify,” and “promote.” Almost none of the proposed actions come with a numerical target, a deadline, or a performance indicator. How many additional megawatts of electricity will be generated in 2027? How many kilometers of roads will be rehabilitated? What percentage of public procurement will be reserved for local suppliers? How many people will benefit from social safety nets? Complete silence! The concepts used are far too vague and remarkably elastic: “economic patriotism,” “socioeconomic impact budgeting,” a “youth-oriented approach,” “strategic monitoring,” and “effective mechanisms.” Who will be able to say in December 2027 whether the objectives have been achieved? The only figures in the document are macroeconomic. And the sole quantified commitment on expenditure—a target of “at least 30%” of the general budget for investment (paragraph 28)—is itself just another formula: the administration remains free to decide what it classifies as investment. In practice, how can this target be achieved when the government’s first priority is to repay its debt in order to maintain its credibility in international markets, as the Minister of Finance stated during the budget orientation debate? What does a closer reading of the circular reveal? A State which is struggling to pay its creditors on time. It refers to reducing domestic arrears (paragraphs 41 and 59), audited floating debt accumulated between 2000 and 2019 (paragraph 44), outstanding payments, a 2% provision for the carryover of budget appropriations (paragraph 37), salary arrears, pension contributions that have not been remitted, and social liabilities relating to seconded personnel. It even instructs local authorities to clear their outstanding payments using their own resources. Debt servicing could reach CFAF 3,000 billion in 2027. Given the State’s meager revenues, the promise to devote 30% of the budget to investment will have to be forgotten. Paragraph 23 calls for the “optimal mobilization of non-oil domestic revenue.” Yet the oil sector is contracting, the tax base is narrow, and the informal economy is vast. The circular itself acknowledges this reality by proposing restrictions on cash payments. The proposed measures—electronic invoicing, real-time taxation, mining taxation, and “targeted and marginal” customs levies—are long-term undertakings, none of which comes with a quantified and measurable revenue forecast. Worse still, 2027 could be an election year, meaning that revenue mobilization may not be optimized. The President says nothing about this, which is yet another example of bureaucratic double-standards. But all economic and political stakeholders are already preparing for it! What Is Missing: The Equity Capital This circular will not help the country. We do not expect the President of the Republic and his advisers to produce a litany of wishful thinking that is out of line with the country’s economic realities and the budget calendar. This is especially true because the circular remains trapped in a single approach: borrowing. It devotes ten paragraphs to debt (paragraphs 52 to 59), the National Public Debt Committee, securities issuance, and both concessional and non-concessional borrowing. Yet long-term structural financing cannot rely on debt alone, which increases future debt-servicing costs and exposes the country to interest-rate and exchange-rate risks. We expect the President of the Republic and his advisers to offer the country shock therapy in response to the pressing financial challenges of the moment. What Cameroon needs is the equity capital: capital contributions that share risk rather than create debt. This means opening infrastructure projects to institutional investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds; developing private equity and infrastructure funds; energizing regional capital markets; attracting foreign direct investment through stable legal frameworks; and mobilizing savings from the diaspora.